

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01  
SIG-01 A-01 MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07  
INRE-00 PM-04 CU-02 AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00  
DODE-00 FEA-01 NSC-05 TRSE-00 USIE-00 NSCE-00  
/090 W

-----192308Z 015419 /62

O R 181300Z APR 77  
FM AMCONSUL BELIZE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5570  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR  
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA  
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA  
AMEMBASSY TAGUCIGALPA  
USCINCSO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BELIZE 00253

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T ( P A R A 1 . D . )

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: AVGT, PFOR, GT, ECRP  
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: A) CERP 0001, B(B) STATE 38356, (C) STATE 45461  
D) STATE 063134

### 1. U. S. INTERESTS.

A. THE PRINCIPAL U. S. INTEREST IN BELIZE IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH  
OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UK, WITH GUATEMALA AND WITH THE SPANISH-  
SPEAKING COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA STAND TO BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED  
BY THE UK-GUATEMALA TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE  
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BLACK CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE THIRD WORLD  
COULD ALSO CONCEIVABLY BE AFFECTED. CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN BELIZE  
WOULD POSE SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR U. S. INTERESTS.

B. ONCE BELIZE ACHIEVES INDEPENDENCE, ITS GOVERNMENT WILL BE  
IN A POSITION TO MAKE DECISIONS CONCERNING ITS POLITICAL BE-  
HAVIOR AND AFFILIATIONS WHICH COULD CAUSE US (OR SPARE US)

FUTURE TROUBLE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO KEEP OUR RELATIONS AS AMICABLE AS POSSIBLE.

C. OTHERWISE, OUR INTERESTS IN BELIZE ARE RELATED TO ITS PRODUCTIVITY AS A SOURCE OF FOOD; THE COUNTRY (ABOUT THE SIZE OF MASSACHUSETTS) IS PRODUCING ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF ITS POTENTIAL. ONCE INDEPENDENCE IS ACHIEVED, AN INCREASE IN THE COUNTRY'S EXPORTS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO ITS ECONOMIC HEALTH AND CONSEQUENTLY TO ITS POLITICAL STABILITY.

D. THE ABOVE DESCRIBED INTERESTS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DEPENDENT ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN RESOURCES; HENCE, WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SOCIAL PROGRESS IN BELIZE, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND HEALTH.

2. CONSUL GENERAL'S OVERVIEW. ALTHOUGH THE URGENCY OF THE BELIZE DISPUTE SEEMS TO HAVE RECEDED IN RECENT MONTHS, THIS LULL IS PROBABLY ILLUSORY. A NUMBER OF DESTABILIZING INFLUENCES PERSIST, AND THESE CAN BE EXPECTED TO WORSEN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD; NAMELY,

A. ITHE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA, RECENTLY FREED FROM THE RESTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE U. S. MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACQUIRE NEW WEAPONS TO COUNTER THE RECENTLY INCREASED BRITISH MILITARY CAPABILITY. THE UK MAY THEN BE FACED WITH THE NECESSITY OF FURTHER AUGMENTING ITS MILITARY FORCES HERE. THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE DONE AT THE EXPENSE OF ITS NATO FORCES. IN ANY CASE, THE ESCALATION OF THE PAST FEW YEARS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE.

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B. FACED WITH THE NEED TO SPEND EVER-INCREASING SUMS OF MONEY, WHICH THEY CAN ILL AFFORD, TO DEFEND TERRITORY THEY CONSIDER VALUELESS, THE BRITISH CAN BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM BELIZE. INDICATIONS ARE THAT HMG MAY NOW BE CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO ENABLE BELIZE TO BECOME INDEPENDENT IN THE ABSENCE OF GUATEMALAN ECQUIESCENCE. AN UNSTABLE ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE THE OUTCOME.

C. PREMIER PRICE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO INCREASE THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE BELIZE PROBLEM, AND IF THE CURRENT UK-GUATEMALA TALKS REACH AN IMPASSE, WHICH NOW SEEMS LIKELY, THE PREMIER CAN BE EXPECTED TO BROADEN HIS SEARCH FOR GUARANTORS OF BELIZEAN SECURITY; THUS, AN EVENTUAL ROLE FOR CUBA CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

D. THE OIL EXPLORATION PROGRAM NOW UNDERWAY IN SOUTHERN BELIZE PROBABLY ELIMINATES ANY CHANCE THAT PREMIER PRICE COULD MAKE ANY TERRITORIAL CESSION TO GUATEMALA, EVEN IF

BELIZE'S ONLY HOPE OK INDEPENDENCE DEPENDED ON IT.

3. THUS, THE OUTLOOK IS FOR CONTINUED DETERIORATION OF THE STATUS QUO; MEANWHILE, THE CHANCES OF EVENTUAL CONFLICT ARE PROBABLY INCREASING. IN SHORT, SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS -- I.E., THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE AREA, OUR RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED -- WHICH OUR POLICY IS SUPPOSED TO FURTHER ARE NOT BEING FURTHERED; INSTEAD, THESE INTERESTS ARE COMING UNDER GREATER JEOPARDY. THEREFORE, AS SEEN FROM BELIZE, OUR POLICY OF NONINVOLVEMENT SEEMS INCREASINGLY INADEQUATE. THE BASIC PREMISE ON WHICH THIS POLICY WAS BASED -- I. E., THAT THE DISPUTANTS STOOD THE BEST CHANCE OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE -- HAS NOT BEEN BORNE OUT BY EVENTS.

4. A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR THE U. S. MAY NOW BE INDICATED ALTHOUGH THE LIMITATIONS SEEM FORMIDABLE, AS DO THE RISKS.

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BUT A GOOD OFFICIALS ROLE MAY BE WORTH CONSIDERING NOW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN WHATEVER COMBINATION OF CARROT AND STICK A SETTLEMENT MAY REQUIRE SHOULD BE GIVEN FURTHER STUDY. POLICY OPTIONS PREVIOUSLY DISCARDED AS TOO COSTLY SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED AND COMPARED WITH THE POTENTIAL COST OF DOING NOTHING.

5. EVEN IF THE GUATEMALAN CLAIM WERE TO BE DISPOSED OF, A PROBLEM-FREE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED. QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF THE BELIZEAN MINI-STATE WOULD STILL REMAIN.

6. IN TERMS OF BASIC ECONOMIC POTENTIAL, OUR CONCLUSION HERE, AFTER SOME STUDY, IS THAT AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, ALTHOUGH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE WOULD BE NEEDED. THE VIABILITY OF BELIZEAN INSTITUTIONS IS MORE DIFFICULT TO APPRAISE. THE GOVERNMENT SUFFERS FROM INEFFICIENCY AND CORRUPTION. THE POPULATION IS MUCH TOO SMALL FOR THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IS BETTER THAN THAT FOUND IN MANY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES ARE RELATIVELY HONEST AND THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ARE EXCEPTIONAL. THE QUESTION IS HOW THESE INSTITUTIONS WOULD EVOLVE IN THE ABSENCE OF BRITISH SUPERVISION. MY GUESS IS THAT THE OUTCOME WOULD PROBABLY BE NO BETTER AND NO WORSE THAN SIMILAR TRANSITIONS TO INDEPENDENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF BRITISH COLONIAL HERITAGE. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GUIDE THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE CRITICAL INITIAL PERIOD OF ITS INDEPENDENCE.

7. A SPECIAL PROBLEM WHICH WOULD VIRTUALLY GUARANTEE THE

NONVIABILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT BELIZE IS CONTAINED IC RECENT  
U. S. VISA LEGISLATION. UNDER THIS LAW BELIZE (POPULATION  
120,000) WOULD HAVE AN ANNUAL IMMIGRATION QUOTA OF 20,000  
IMMIGRANT VISAS PER YEAR. WITH 35,000 TO 50,000 BELIZEANS ALREADY  
IN THE U. S. TO LINE UP SUPPORT, THE CHANCES ARE THAT A LARGE PART  
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OF THIS QUOTA WOULD BE FILLED UNTIL THE COUNTRY WAS ALMOST DEPOPULATED. I URGE THE DEPARTMENT TO SPONSOR LEGISLATION TO AVERT THIS  
OVIOUS ABSURDITY. THIS SHOULD BE DONE NOW RATHER THAN ON THE EVE  
OF INDEPENDENCE WHEN IT WOULD BE MOST AWKWARD FOR US.

8. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES.

A. OBJECTIVES:

- 1) TO PREVENT THE BELIZE DISPUTE FROM BECOMING AN ARMED CONFLICT.
- 2) TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE GOB;
- 3) TO ENCOURAGE CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

B. ISSUES:

- 1) SHOULD WE SEEK A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE BELIZE DISPUTE?
- 2) SHOULD WE DO MORE THAN WE ARE NOW DOING IN PROMOTING THE  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF BELIZE?

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01  
A-01 MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 INRE-00  
PM-04 CU-02 AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00  
FEA-01 NSC-05 TRSE-00 USIE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /090 W  
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O R 181300Z APR 77  
FM AMCONSSL BELIZE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5571  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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AMEVBASSY TEGUCIGALPA  
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BELIZE 00253

C. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION:

1) SHIFT THE EMPHASIS IN OUR POLICY AWAY FROM NON-INVOLVEMENT; INSTEAD, ACTIVELY SEEK WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN PROMOTE A SOLUTION TO THE DISPUTE. STUDY WHAT INDUCEMENTS WE MIGHT OFFER AND WHAT PRESSURES WE MIGHT APPLY TO THE DISPUTANTS TO GET THEM TO AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT:

2) MAINTAIN AID, PEACE CORPS AND CU PROGRAMS AT ABOUT CURRENT LEVELS WHICH SEEM TO BE ABOUT ALL THE BELIZEANS CAN USE EFFECTIVELY.

3) SPONSOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE CURRENT VISA LAWS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THAT, DESPITE THE QUOTA LEVELS CONTAINED IN THE 1976 LEGISLATION, NO COUNTRY'S QUOTA CAN EXCEED 1/2 OF 1 PERCENT OF THAT COUNTRY'S POPULATION. THIS WOULD  
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SOLVE THE PROBLEM OUTLINED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF MY OVERVIEW STATEMENT AND PERHAPS THAT OF OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES AS WELL. IT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE QUOTAS OF THE LARGER COUNTRIES.  
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